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NOTE 
 
UNITED STATES V. PAYTON: 
REDEFINING THE 
REASONABLENESS STANDARD FOR 
COMPUTER SEARCHES     AND 
SEIZURES 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a scenario where officers arrive at a residence to 
execute a search warrant in which evidence of drug use and 
documents indicating drug trafficking are sought.  The officers 
search the home and find evidence of drug use but no documents 
related to drug sales.  They enter the bedroom and find both a file 
cabinet and a computer.  Based upon the officers’ experience and 
training, they know that both the file cabinet and the computer 
could contain items enumerated on the warrant – one in paper 
form and the other in digital form.  Neither the file cabinet nor the 
computer is listed on the warrant, nor, the officers believe, is such 
a listing required for them to search either one.  Under traditional 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the officers can look in any 
container where the items they seek could reasonably be 
expected to be found.  The Fourth Amendment makes no 
distinction between a computer and a file cabinet, but the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit now does. 
United States v. Payton1 held that officers may not seize or 
search a computer unless there are “circumstances indicating a 
likelihood” that the officers will find the evidence they seek on that 
 
 1 United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2009). 
1
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particular computer.2  In its holding, the court distinguished 
traditional containers, such as file cabinets, from computers, 
holding that, in contrast to the rule applicable to a traditional 
container, it is not enough that the computer “could” contain the 
evidence; rather, there must be some showing that the computer 
“would” contain the evidence.3  This creates an impractical 
constraint upon searches and seizures of computers and is 
contrary to U.S. Supreme Court precedent and the Fourth 
Amendment.4  Payton further marks a change in direction from 
previous Ninth Circuit decisions by approaching what appears to 
be a bright-line rule, namely that officers may not search a 
computer without a warrant.5  If a computer search is not 
authorized on the original warrant, officers must demonstrate 
“circumstances indicating a likelihood” that what they are looking 
for would be found in a particular computer.6  In turn, this would 
allow the officers to secure the computer while applying for a 
subsequent warrant to search the computer.7  Even as the Ninth 
Circuit presumably intended to protect constitutional privacy 
interests by changing the reasonableness standard in computer 
searches from “could” to “would,” the unintended results will likely 
have the opposite effect.  The most likely result is this:  So long as 
the evidence they are seeking could be found in digital form, the 
officers will simply request authorization, in the initial warrant, to 
search any computer they might find.  By doing so, they will – in 
the event they find a computer in their initial search – avoid having 
to seek a subsequent warrant by demonstrating circumstances 
that implicate that particular computer.  This unintended 
consequence will weaken the Ninth Circuit’s effort to protect 
individual constitutional privacy in the context of computer 
searches and seizures. 
This Note examines United States v. Payton and the issue of 
when it is reasonable to search a computer if it is not expressly 
authorized on the search warrant.  Part I discusses the 
background facts of Payton and the Fourth Amendment.  Part II 
analyzes why the Ninth Circuit ultimately decided Payton correctly 
but focused on the wrong underlying reason in its holding.  The 
 
 2 Id. at 863. 
 3 Id. at 863. 
 4 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982). 
 5 Payton, 573 F.3d at 863-64. 
 6 Id. at 863. 
 7 Id. 
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reasonableness standard for computer searches should be 
whether the computer “could” contain the evidence, rather than 
the stricter standard of “would” contain the evidence announced in 
Payton.  However, because computers are different from 
traditional containers, they should be subject to judicial 
supervision and a defined search protocol as expressed through a 
warrant.  Part III explains how the Ninth Circuit in Payton 
ultimately did what it had said it would not do in United States v. 
Giberson: create a distinctive category for computers separate 
from traditional containers and imply a bright-line rule mandating 
that a computer may not be searched without a warrant.8  Part IV 
proposes a practical reasonableness standard that balances the 
special needs of a computer search with the flexibility found under 
traditional container theories of searches and seizures.  This Note 
proposes a specific set of guidelines to establish a protocol for 
properly seizing a computer that will effectively balance the 
government’s interest in searching and seizing a computer with 
the computer owner’s privacy interests. 
I.   BACKGROUND 
This Part starts by looking at the facts of United States v. 
Payton and the two issues the Ninth Circuit addressed:  the 
validity of the search warrant and its scope.9  The second section 
of this Part provides a general background of Fourth Amendment 
law and a discussion of probable cause and the scope of a 
warrant.10 
A.   FACTS AND HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. PAYTON 
On July 30, 2004, Officer Jeffrey R. Horn requested a search 
warrant for a residence in Merced, California, based on suspicion 
of drug trafficking and drug use.11  The warrant contained 
“Attachment A,” which listed all drug-related items to be seized, 
including “[s]ales ledgers showing narcotics transactions such as 
pay/owe sheets”12 and “[f]inancial records of the person(s) in 
control of the residence or premises, bank accounts, loan 
 
 8 United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 9 Payton, 573 F.3d at 861. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Opening Brief of Appellant at 5, United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 
2009) (No. 07-10567), 2007 WL 5108020. 
 12 Payton, 573 F.3d at 860. 
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applications, [and] income and expense records.”13 
In the affidavit asserting probable cause, Officer Horn 
requested permission to search any computers in the residence,14 
even though he had no specific basis on which to believe that a 
computer would be found in the house.15  He stated, based on his 
experience and training, that drug dealers “maintain evidence of 
sales of narcotics on their computers.”16  He further requested that 
the warrant “allow [him] to look at computer files, and seize the 
computer if it shows evidence of criminal behavior.”17  The request 
to search any computers in the residence was inadvertently left off 
of “Attachment A,”18 and the magistrate authorized the police to 
search only those items listed.19 
During the execution of the warrant, officers seized a small 
quantity of methamphetamine as well as several pipes that 
appeared to be the type used to smoke controlled substances.20  
The officers also found evidence of marijuana leaves and seeds 
on the floor of the master bedroom, which the officers determined 
to be that of Michael Payton.21  While searching the master 
bedroom, Officer Horn found a computer that he noted to be in 
screen-saver mode.22  Officer Horn moved the mouse to 
deactivate the screen saver; thereafter, the screen showed a list 
of computer files and he clicked on the first one.23  The file opened 
to reveal what appeared to be a naked 10-year-old girl lying on a 
bed with her legs spread apart.24  Officer Horn believed the image 
to be child pornography, closed the file, and seized the 
computer.25  The officers found no evidence of drug sales in the 
residence.26 
Michael Payton was charged with possession of child 
pornography27 and moved to suppress the evidence on two 
 
 13 Id. 
 14 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 5. 
 15 Id. at 8. 
 16 Brief for Appellee at 7, Payton, 573 F.3d 859 (No. 07-10567), 2008 WL 2623359. 
 17 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 8. 
 18 Brief for Appellee, supra note 16, at 7. 
 19 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 6. 
 20 Brief for Appellee, supra note 16, at 7. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id.; United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 23 Brief for Appellee, supra note 16, at 8. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id.; Payton, 573 F.3d at 860. 
 26 Payton, 573 F.3d at 860. 
 27 Michael Payton was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), which 
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grounds.28  He argued that the warrant lacked probable cause and 
that the search of the computer exceeded the scope of the 
warrant.29  The district court denied the motion to suppress the 
evidence, finding that the warrant was based upon sufficient 
probable cause, and ruled that the defect of failing to list the 
computer listed on “Attachment A” was cured by the magistrate’s 
subsequent testimony that he had intended to authorize a search 
of computers.30 
1.   Probable Cause for the Search Warrant 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s ruling that the 
warrant was based upon sufficient probable cause.31  Officer Horn 
stated in his affidavit for probable cause that neighbors had 
complained of drug sales.32  However, during a Franks33 hearing, 
Officer Horn testified that he knew of no neighbors complaining of 
drug sales, only of one neighbor complaining of drug use.34  
Officer Horn had inferred from the complaint of drug use that 
probable drug sales were going on.35  Further, Officer Horn 
testified that he relied on the fact that during the previous arrest of 
 
states that any person who 
knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, 1 or more books, 
magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual 
depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported using any 
means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which have been mailed 
or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if-- 
(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct; and 
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct; 
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Westlaw 2010). 
 28 Payton, 573 F.3d at 860. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 861. 
 31 Id. The district court found that “‘even if [it] excised and consider[ed] the entire 
warrant without a complaint of neighbors of drug sales,’ the warrant was still sufficient in 
light of the other evidence presented.” Id. 
 32 Id. at 860. 
 33 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978).  In a Franks hearing, a 
defendant can challenge the validity of a facially valid warrant by contesting assertions 
made in the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued.  The warrant will be considered 
invalid if the defendant can substantially show:  1) a false statement was included in the 
affidavit, 2) the false statement was necessary to find probable cause, and 3) the affiant 
knowingly or recklessly included the false statement. 
 34 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 8. 
 35 Id. 
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another resident of the home, he and his fellow officers had found 
2.7 grams of methamphetamine pinned to the inside of her bra.36  
The fact that the drugs were divided into two separate bags, as 
well as the quantity involved, led Officer Horn to believe the 
resident possessed the drugs for sale.37  This Case Note will not 
address the issue of probable cause for the warrant and the 
reasoning behind the court’s finding at the Franks hearing but will 
instead focus on the scope of the warrant. 
2.   Scope of Warrant 
In addition to challenging the probable cause supporting the 
warrant, Michael Payton argued that the search of the computer 
exceeded the scope of the warrant because the warrant did not 
authorize the search and seizure of any computers.38  However, 
the district court held that the search of the computer was valid 
“because the failure to include the word ‘computers’ in Attachment 
A was an oversight cured by the issuing judge’s testimony of his 
intent.”39 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court.  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that after-the-fact testimony could not cure the 
search warrant’s lack of the word “computers.”40  Merced County 
Superior Court Judge John Kirihara testified at the federal 
evidentiary hearing regarding the issuance of the warrant, stating 
that he often asks officers to add items to the Attachment that they 
may have missed.41  He did not do so in this case and only 
authorized those items listed.42  Judge Kirihara noted, however, 
that he was aware Officer Horn had requested permission to 
search computers and that he had intended to authorize that 
search.43  Neither Officer Horn nor Judge Kirihara noticed that the 
word “computers” was missing from Attachment A.44 
The Ninth Circuit held that this after-the-fact testimony did not 
provide the authorization necessary to search computers, since 
“one purpose of a warrant is to inform the person subject to the 
 
 36 Id. at 7. 
 37 Brief for Appellee, supra note 16, at 5. 
 38 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 11. 
 39 United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 40 Id. at 862. 
 41 Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 6. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 6-7. 
 44 Id. at 7. 
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search just what may be searched.”45  Upon this holding, the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis turned to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
concerning the circumstances in which a computer may be seized 
and searched absent express authorization in a search warrant. 
B.  RELEVANT FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.46 
The Fourth Amendment was adopted in 1791 in response to 
the English practice of issuing general warrants against political 
suspects, and the colonial practice of issuing writs of assistance 
against those suspected of smuggling goods.47  The general 
warrant and the writ of assistance gave executing officers 
authority to search without limitation48 and allowed “a general, 
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”49  To curtail 
these general warrants and writs of assistance, the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures. 50 
The Fourth Amendment applies to searches or seizures 
under two conditions.  First, the government must be performing 
the search or seizure.51  The Fourth Amendment does not protect 
a search or seizure performed by a private actor.52  Second, a 
person must have a justifiable expectation of privacy in the 
intruded-upon area.53  This requires the person whose property is 
searched or seized to have both a subjective expectation of 
privacy as well as an objective one “that society is prepared to 
 
 45 Payton, 573 F.3d at 862 (citing United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th 
Cir. 1986)). 
 46 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 47 Osmond K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 
361-64 (1921). 
 48 Id. at 361. 
 49 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). 
 50 Fraenkel, supra note 47, at 366. 
 51 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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recognize as reasonable.”54 
In Katz v. United States, the FBI attached an electronic 
listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth and 
recorded a conversation.55  The United States Supreme Court 
determined that Katz had a subjective expectation of privacy when 
he entered the telephone booth and placed his phone call, based 
on the rationale that he had no reason to believe his conversation 
would be overheard.56  In addition, the Supreme Court determined 
that Katz had an objective expectation of privacy,57 holding that 
while a public telephone booth provides no expectation of privacy 
in what can be seen, there is an expectation of privacy in what can 
be heard.58 
A governmental search or seizure of property in which a 
person has a subjective and objective expectation of privacy 
violates the Fourth Amendment if it is “unreasonable.”59  The 
Supreme Court has explained that reasonableness is determined 
by “balancing [the] intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against [the] promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”60  The search or seizure is reasonable if it is authorized 
by a valid warrant or if it fits in one of the warrant exceptions.61 
In a warrant situation as in Payton, a neutral magistrate judge 
conducts the balancing test and determines whether a search 
warrant will be issued.62  The search warrant must (1) be based 
 
 54 Id. at 361. 
 55 Id. at 348 (majority opinion). 
 56 Id. at 352. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 60 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). 
 61 There are limited circumstances in which officers may conduct a search or seizure 
without a warrant.  These include the following: searches that are incident to a lawful arrest, 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); searches of automobiles when 
officers have probable cause to believe instrumentalities of crime, evidence, or contraband 
are within the automobile, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); seizures of 
contraband when it is in plain view of an officer, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
465 (1971); searches of people whom the police have an articulable suspicion to believe 
are involved in criminal activity, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); searches of places 
and things when the officers are given consent by a person with authority to consent, 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); and searches and seizures due to 
exigent circumstances.  Exigent circumstances include hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967), reason to believe that evidence will be 
destroyed before a warrant can be obtained, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 
(1966), and reason to believe someone may be in imminent danger, Brigham City v. 
Stewart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006). 
 62 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971). 
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upon probable cause and supported by oath or affirmation, and (2) 
particularly describe the places to be searched and the items to be 
seized.63  The language of the warrant determines the scope of 
the search, which in turn is based on an objective standard of 
reasonableness.64 
1. Search Warrant’s Probable-Cause Determination 
Probable cause is a fluid concept that does not deal with hard 
certainties.65  It exists when facts and circumstances would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that seizable evidence would be 
found on the premises or person to be searched.66  Whether there 
is sufficient information to give rise to probable cause is based on 
the totality of the circumstances.67  Under this approach, the 
relative weights of all indicia of reliability can be assessed and 
balanced.68  Under this standard, no single piece of evidence need 
be conclusive.  Rather, everything is examined in light of the other 
facts.  Accordingly, an officer wishing to apply for a search warrant 
must prepare an affidavit outlining the facts69 that cause the officer 
to believe the evidence sought would be at the time and place that 
the search is to be conducted.70 
An officer may prepare an affidavit based entirely on 
hearsay,71 such as testimony by a victim of crime, witnesses, or 
police informants.  In using hearsay information, the affidavit must 
show that the informant is reliable and has a basis of knowledge 
for the information.72  The affidavit is then presented to a neutral 
magistrate, who makes an independent evaluation as to whether 
there is sufficient probable cause.73 
2. Particularity Requirement 
“The Fourth Amendment’s specificity requirement prevents 
 
 63 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 64 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984). 
 65 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 252 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment). 
 68 Id. at 234 (majority opinion). 
 69 Affidavits must consist of facts and not conclusions.  See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108, 114 (1964). 
 70 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
 71 Id. at 242. 
 72 Id. at 227. 
 73 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965). 
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officers from engaging in general, exploratory searches by limiting 
their discretion and providing specific guidance as to what can and 
cannot be searched and seized.”74  This requirement prevents 
what may amount to a fishing expedition.  As the Supreme Court 
explained: 
By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and 
things for which there is probable cause to search, the 
requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to 
its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-
ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to 
prohibit.75 
Therefore, the more detailed and specific the descriptions of 
the items to be seized on the warrant are, the more limited the 
search will be, and the more likely the warrant will be upheld as 
constitutional. 
A warrant is deemed unconstitutional if it does not describe 
with sufficient particularity the place to be searched and the items 
to be seized, even if the affidavit itself is sufficiently 
particularized.76  However, the warrant need only be “reasonably 
specific, rather than elaborately detailed,”77 “and the specificity 
required ‘varies depending on the circumstances of the case and 
the type of items involved.’”78  For example, a warrant authorizing 
the seizure of accounting-related documents like ledgers, bank 
records, and spreadsheets would likely satisfy the particularity 
requirement.  However, the description of accounting-related 
documents does not have to be exact.79 
 
 74 United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 75 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). 
 76 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004). 
 77 United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1551 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States 
v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
 78 Rude, 88 F.3d at 1551 (quoting United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th 
Cir. 1986)). 
 79 The Ninth Circuit considers three factors in determining whether a warrant meets 
the particularity requirement: 
(1) [W]hether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described 
in the warrant; (2) whether the warrant sets out objective standards by which 
executing officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from those which are not; 
and (3) whether the government was able to describe the items more particularly in 
light of the information available to it at the time the warrant was issued. 
United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. 
Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
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3. The Scope of a Search Is Based on an Objective Standard of 
 Reasonableness 
The scope of a search warrant is based on an objective 
standard determined by the language of the warrant, without 
regard to the subjective intent of the executing officers or the 
issuing magistrate judge.80  Thus, “[a] policeman’s pure heart does 
not entitle him to exceed the scope of a search warrant, nor does 
his ulterior motive bar a search within the scope of the warrant, 
where the warrant was properly issued.”81  The objective standard 
of reasonableness must guide the officer in his or her search.82 
In using an objective reasonableness standard, the officer 
cannot look for an object in places smaller than the object 
authorized by the warrant.83  However, once an officer finds a 
container that may conceal the object authorized by the warrant, 
the container may be opened immediately.84  The Supreme Court 
justified this by stating that “the individual’s interest in privacy must 
give way to the magistrate’s official determination of probable 
cause.”85 
Moreover, there is no Fourth Amendment distinction between 
traditional containers that are readily accessible and those that are 
locked.86  Once again, the courts have held that the driving factor 
is one of “reasonableness.”87  If it is reasonable to believe a 
container may have evidence within it, the officer may take 
measures to open it.88  An officer does not need to seek a 
separate warrant to search a locked container if he or she is 
working within the scope of the original warrant.89  As the Fifth 
Circuit has explained, to hold otherwise would 
require either that “an additional search warrant (be obtained) 
for each container within a larger container,” or that the agent 
seeking the warrant possess extrasensory perception so that he 
 
 80 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 81 United States v. Ewain, 88 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 82 Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). 
 83 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982). 
 84 Id. at 823. 
 85 Ross, 456 U.S. at 823. 
 86 United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United 
States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568, 573) (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 87 See, e.g., United States. V. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
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could describe, prior to entering the house, the specific boxes, 
suitcases, sofas, closets, etc. that he anticipated searching. 
Obviously, neither alternative is either reasonable or required.90 
This holds true even if the container cannot be opened on the 
premises and must be removed to be opened.91 
II.   PAYTON REACHED THE RIGHT RESULT BUT FOCUSED ON THE 
 WRONG REASON 
In Payton, the Ninth Circuit suppressed the evidence obtained 
from the computer for two reasons.  First, the search of the 
computer was unreasonable.92  Second, the search was not 
authorized by a warrant.93  However, in reaching its conclusion, 
the court followed Giberson and changed the standard of 
reasonableness from one requiring only that the evidence could 
be found in the computer to one requiring circumstances that 
indicate the evidence would be found in the computer.94 
In doing so, the Ninth Circuit departed from Supreme Court 
precedent95 in container searches and applied an impractical 
reasonableness standard.  In its holding, the court states that 
absent evidence implicating the computer, a computer cannot be 
seized (and by implication, a subsequent warrant will not issue).96  
Since in Payton there were no circumstances indicating a 
likelihood that the evidence would be found in the computer, the 
court held that the search of the computer was unreasonable.97 
The Ninth Circuit should only have considered whether the 
items could have been found on the computer and the fact that a 
 
 90 United States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Kralik, 611 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Cir. 1979)). 
 91 United States v. Johnson, 709 F.2d 515, 516 (8th Cir. 1983) (locked safe 
reasonably believed to contain items enumerated in warrant was permissibly moved to 
police station where it could be opened). 
 92 United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 862-63 (quoting United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 
2008)). 
 95 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982). 
 96 In United States v. Giberson, the court held that, absent “evidence” implicating the 
computer, a seizure of Giberson’s computer would not have been reasonable. Giberson, 
527 F.3d at 887.  In United States v. Payton, the court applied the same standard to the 
search of a computer and reasoned that “the special considerations of reasonableness 
involved in the search of computers are reflected in the practice . . . of searching officers to 
stop and seek an explicit warrant when they encounter a computer that they have reason to 
believe should be searched.”  Payton, 573 F.3d at 864 (emphasis added). 
 97 Payton, 573 F.3d at 863. 
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subsequent warrant for the computer was not obtained.  Even 
though it was reasonable for the officer to suspect that the 
computer contained the items he sought, by not obtaining a 
warrant for its search, he acted in the absence of judicial 
supervision and without an approved search protocol.  This 
reasoning would still have allowed the court to suppress the 
evidence while retaining a reasonableness standard consistent 
with Supreme Court precedent. 
This Part begins by explaining the Ninth Circuit’s basis for 
suppressing the evidence.  Next, this Part analyzes the 
reasonableness standard set forth in Payton and discusses why 
this rule is impractical and will likely have unintended 
consequences.  This requires a journey back to United States v. 
Giberson, the prior precedent-setting case on search warrants and 
computers.  This also requires a brief survey and comparison of 
other jurisdictions’ standards on this issue.  This Part concludes 
with an analysis of the differences between a computer and a 
traditional container and why there should be different search 
protocols for each of them. 
A. NINTH CIRCUIT’S BASIS FOR SUPPRESSING THE EVIDENCE 
The Ninth Circuit found the actions of the officers in Payton 
unreasonable for two reasons.  First, in the course of Officer 
Horn’s search, he did not find evidence to support his conclusion 
that the computer he found contained items enumerated in the 
warrant.98  Instead, Officer Horn relied on the fact that the 
evidence he sought could be found on a computer.99  In its 
analysis, the court applied the stricter “would” standard it first 
enunciated in Giberson100 and found that the facts of Payton did 
not meet that standard.101 
In Giberson, agents had a search warrant to look for, among 
other things, evidence pertaining to identity theft.102  Upon 
executing the warrant, the officers discovered a personal 
computer on a desk in one of the bedrooms.103  The computer was 
 
 98 Payton, 573 F.3d at 864. 
 99 Id. at 863 (recognizing that pay/owe sheets are physically capable of being kept 
on a computer). 
 100 Giberson, 527 F.3d at 887. 
 101 Payton, 573 F.3d at 684. 
 102 Giberson, 527 F.3d at 884. 
 103 Id. 
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connected to a printer located on an adjacent dresser.104  On the 
dresser were “what appeared to be fake Nevada I.D. cards” that 
seemed to have been printed from the printer.105  Upon searching 
the desk and surrounding area, the agents found documents 
“evidencing the production of false I.D.s, including fake Social 
Security cards and State of New York birth certificates . . . .”106  
The officers then seized the computer and secured a second 
search warrant to search the computer itself.107 
The Payton court approved of the officers’ actions in Giberson 
and applied the same analysis to Payton.108  In Payton, the court 
reiterated Giberson’s rule of reasonableness:  “If it is reasonable 
to believe that a computer contains items enumerated in the 
warrant, officers may search it.”109  While this appears fairly broad 
in scope, the court went on to narrow its position and reiterated 
the new reasonableness standard it created in Giberson, stating 
that “where there was ample evidence that the documents in the 
warrant could be found on Giberson’s computer, the officers did 
not exceed the scope of the warrant when they seized the 
computer.”110  The Payton court applied the same reasonableness 
standard it used to approve the seizure of Giberson’s computer to 
the search of Payton’s computer.111  The court concluded there 
was an absence of “legitimating facts” in Payton.112 
Second, the court expressed disapproval of the fact that 
Officer Horn chose to search the computer first, before seeking a 
second warrant authorizing the search.113  This was in contrast to 
the actions of the agent in Giberson, who seized the computer 
first, and then sought a warrant before the search.114 
 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Giberson, 527 F.3d at 884-85. 
 107 Id. at 885. 
 108 United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 109 Payton, 573 F.3d at 864 (quoting Giberson, 527 F.3d at 888). 
 110 Id. at 863 (emphasis in original). 
 111 Id. at 862-63. 
 112 Id. at 864. 
 113 Id. at 863. 
 114 Id. 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol40/iss3/3
2010] COMPUTER SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 311 
B. THE STANDARD FOR REASONABLENESS IN SEARCHING
 COMPUTERS SHOULD BE THE SAME STANDARD AS FOR  OTHER 
TRADITIONAL CONTAINERS 
The reasonableness standard set forth by the Ninth Circuit in 
Payton is impractical.  The officers in Payton were looking for 
documents that could reasonably be found in a computer.  In 
today’s society, most people create spreadsheets on their 
computers and download bank records directly to their computers.  
As a result, a computer would be a reasonable place to search for 
items such as pay/owe sheets and other financial documents.  
Therefore, it was reasonable for the officer in Payton to believe 
the computer was a place where the items in the warrant could be 
found. 
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Payton from Giberson, noting 
that, unlike the agents in Giberson, the officers in Payton found 
nothing to indicate a likelihood that the computer contained the 
evidence for which they were looking.115  The court again 
reiterated its position on reasonableness, stating that it is not 
enough that the evidence is capable of being contained in a 
computer.116  In order for a search to be reasonable, there must 
be “circumstances indicating a likelihood” that the items to be 
seized are contained in the computer.117 
Apart from the specific facts provided in Giberson, the Ninth 
Circuit has offered very little guidance as to how “circumstances 
indicating a likelihood” should be interpreted.  There is no 
indication of how strong a likelihood is needed, or how much 
evidence is needed.  If the circumstances of Giberson are used as 
a guide, it would seem that the court requires a near certainty.  In 
Giberson, there was an incriminating document sitting next to the 
printer that was connected to the computer.118  Because the 
document was not of high quality, the officers believed it had 
come from the printer.119  The association between the document 
and the printer, and the printer’s connection to the computer, was 
clear.  It is difficult to imagine what different or additional 
circumstances could arise so as to more clearly implicate a 
specific computer.  If the officers in Payton had found a printout of 
 
 115 Payton, 573 F.3d at 863. 
 116 Id. at 864. 
 117 Id. at 863. 
 118 United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 119 Id. 
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a pay/owe sheet in the same bedroom as the computer, but did 
not find the document on or near a printer, it is unclear whether 
the discovery of the document would have risen to the 
“circumstances indicating a likelihood” standard. 
Thus, Giberson’s and Payton’s “would be found” standard is 
much stricter than the “could be found” standard for traditional 
containers and computers used previously by the Ninth Circuit, its 
sister circuits, and other courts.  Payton, by upholding Giberson, 
puts the Ninth Circuit out of line from the rest of the circuits across 
the country. 
1. Prior to Giberson, Ninth Circuit Precedent Followed the 
 “Could Be Found” Reasonableness Standard 
In United States v. Gomez-Soto, the Ninth Circuit stated that 
“it is axiomatic that if a warrant sufficiently describes the premises 
to be searched, this will justify a search of the personal effects 
therein belonging to the person occupying the premises if those 
effects might contain the items described in the warrant.”120  In 
Gomez-Soto, officers conducted a search for documentation 
pertaining to drug trafficking and seized a microcassette.121  The 
court upheld the seizure, noting that microcassettes are used as a 
device for recording all types of information, including the type that 
would fall within the scope of the warrant.122  It further noted that a 
warrant need not predict the form of the container in which the 
information may be found.123  There is no mention of ample 
evidence or circumstances making it likely the microcassette 
contained the evidence sought.  Rather, it was simply because the 
microcassette could contain the information sought that the court 
found the seizure reasonable. 
In circumstances similar to those of Payton, in the Ninth 
Circuit’s unpublished case of United States v. Sprewell, the 
officers were executing a search warrant looking for evidence of 
drug sales.124  Among the items sought were “ ‘any talley sheets 
or pay and owe sheets which tend to establish any narcotics and 
 
 120 United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasis 
added). 
 121 Id. at 652-54. 
 122 Id. at 655. 
 123 Id. 
 124 United States v. Sprewell, Nos. 89-50571, 89-50695, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 
14094, at *1 (9th Cir. June 26, 1991) (unpublished). 
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dangerous drug transactions.’ ”125  As in Payton, the officers 
discovered a computer during their search and seized it.126  The 
court drew a comparison to its analysis in Gomez-Soto and stated 
that “a computer is ‘by its very nature a device for recording 
information.’ ”127  The court upheld the seizure and explained it 
was not necessary to predict with precision what form the 
evidence would be in for the warrant to be valid.128  In assessing 
whether an item described by a warrant meets the particularity 
requirement, the court considered whether it was possible for the 
officer to more specifically describe the items to be seized based 
on his or her information at the time the warrant was issued.129  
Again, there was nothing that provided extra assurance that the 
officers would find what they were looking for on the computer.  It 
was enough that the computer by its very nature could contain 
what they were looking for.130  Therefore it was reasonable for the 
officers to seize it.131 
2. Other Courts Follow the “Could Be Found” Reasonableness 
 Standard 
In the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Carey, officers 
were given written consent to search the premises for evidence of 
drug sales, and in the course of their search they came upon and 
seized a personal computer.132  The court upheld the seizure, 
noting that 
“in the age of modern technology and the commercial 
availability of various forms of items, the warrant could not be 
expected to describe with exactitude the precise form the 
records would take” because drug records might be found in 
cassettes, leases and accounts cards, or cancelled checks.133 
The court did not create an extra requirement that the officers 
executing the search find some additional evidence to implicate 
 
 125 Id. at *10 (quoting the search warrant). 
 126 Id. at *10-11. 
 127 Id. at *12 (quoting Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d at 655). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at *13 (quoting United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at *10-13. 
 132 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 133 Id. at 1275 n.7 (quoting United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 
1986)). 
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the computer. 
The Colorado Supreme Court determined that the “container 
rationale is equally applicable to nontraditional, technological 
‘containers’ that are reasonably likely to hold information in less 
tangible forms.”134  Under this reasoning, the court upheld the 
seizure of five laptop computers during a search for “materials that 
provided instructions or examples concerning the production or 
use of any firearms, ammunitions, and explosive or incendiary 
devices or parts, as well as materials showing an intent to do 
physical harm or physical damage against any person or 
building.”135  The court found the computers were “likely to serve 
as ‘containers’ for writings, or the functional equivalent of ‘written 
or printed material,’ of a type enumerated in the warrant.”136 
Like the Ninth Circuit in Gomez-Soto, the Colorado Supreme 
Court noted that a warrant cannot always predict the form in which 
evidence will come.137  The court determined that the laptops were 
reasonably likely to serve as containers for the writings listed in 
the warrant.138  As a part of its reasonableness analysis, the court 
took note that the laptops “were not found in a packaged state or 
in any way suggesting that they could not have been used for the 
purposes for which they were designed,” thereby making them fair 
game.139 
In Commonwealth v. McDermott, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court likewise upheld a warrantless seizure of a 
computer on the ground that the computer was similar to a closed 
container and was capable of holding documents that were sought 
under the search warrant.140  Among the items sought by the 
officers there were documents “reflecting the possession, custody, 
or control of the premises; documents reflecting the purchase of, 
or license to carry, firearms and ammunition; documents reflecting 
the employment, salary, and garnishment of wages of the 
defendant. . . .”141 
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District also 
upheld a seizure of a laptop computer during a search for stolen 
 
 134 People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 153 (Colo. 2001). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Gall, 30 P.3d at 153-54. 
 139 Id. at 154. 
 140 Commonwealth v. McDermott, 864 N.E. 471, 484 (Mass. 2007). 
 141 Id. at 483. 
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goods.142  The warrant included the authority to seize any items 
“tending to show dominion and control of the location,” and listed a 
number of items in which this evidence could be found.143  The 
defendant argued that the laptop was not one of the enumerated 
items and therefore should not have been seized.144  The court 
upheld the seizure and concluded that the officers “could not be 
expected to divine in advance of their entry the precise nature of 
such evidence – whether mail, bills, checks, invoices, other 
documents, or keys.”145  The court further stated that it would be 
“patently unreasonable” for the officers to be expected to know the 
exact locations of such evidence.146 
3. Payton’s “Circumstances Indicating a Likelihood” Standard Is 
 Impractical and Creates a Loophole That Undermines Privacy 
In Payton, the court held the search of the computer and its 
subsequent seizure was unreasonable because there was no 
evidence to implicate the computer, even though the computer 
would be a logical place to find spreadsheets and other 
documents enumerated in the warrant.147  The trouble with this 
holding is that it requires officers to have advance knowledge of 
the form and location in which evidence may be found (e.g., that 
the evidence will be electronic in nature and will be found in a 
computer).  However, the Fourth Amendment does not require a 
list of the items to be searched (e.g., a safe, file cabinet, 
computer).  Since an officer does not need to make such a 
showing on the original warrant, it makes little sense to create a 
stricter standard once a previously unknown computer is 
discovered. 
As noted above, courts in other jurisdictions have found this 
requirement to be unreasonable.148  The likely result of such a 
condition is that computers will be listed on a warrant if it is likely 
that the items sought could be found on a computer, regardless of 
 
 142 People v. Balint, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 211, 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 216. 
 145 Id. at 217 (quoting People v. Rogers, 232 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986)). 
 146 Balint, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 208 (quoting People v. Rogers, 232 Cal. Rptr. 294, 
298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)). 
 147 United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 148 See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999); People v. Gall, 
30 P.3d 145, 153 (Colo. 2001); Commonwealth v. McDermott, 864 N.E. 471, 484 (Mass. 
2007); Balint, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 218. 
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any advance knowledge as to their presence in order for officers 
to preserve the option of a computer search should a computer be 
found.  This in turn incentivizes an end run around the Ninth 
Circuit’s rule that, absent listing the computer in the warrant, 
evidence must be found implicating a particular computer in order 
to render the seizure and search reasonable.149 
C. COMPUTERS ARE NOT TRADITIONAL CONTAINERS ANDSHOULD 
 REQUIRE DIFFERENT SEARCH PROTOCOLS               AND A 
 WARRANT 
Due to the vast amount of information a computer can hold, a 
search for a few documents can easily turn into a general search 
in the absence of judicial supervision.150  The Ninth Circuit 
expressed such a concern if it was to uphold the search of 
Payton’s computer under a traditional container theory, because 
“[s]uch a ruling would eliminate any incentive for officers to seek 
explicit judicial authorization for searches of computers.”151 
Since a search of a computer is fundamentally different from 
a search of any other type of container,152 the better approach is 
to have a search protocol specific to computers.  This section 
outlines the differences between a computer and a traditional 
container, such as the vastly superior amount of information a 
computer can hold, the mechanism by which a computer holds 
information, and the physical limitations of a computer.  Next, this 
section discusses briefly how courts dealt with new technologies 
before the advent of computers.  Finally, the section concludes by 
discussing the concerns outlined in Payton. 
1. Differences Between a Computer and a Traditional Container 
The impulse to analogize a computer to a traditional container 
is natural.  A computer is an object that contains things, just as 
any traditional container does.  However, this is where the 
similarity between a computer and a traditional container ends.  
While the contents of an open container are visible to the naked 
eye, a computer contains much more.  In fact, it is the inherent 
opaqueness of a computer’s digital contents, and the privacy that 
 
 149 Payton, 573 F.3d at 863-64. 
 150 Id. at 864. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Payton, 573 F.3d at 863-64. 
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it allows the user, that is both its damning quality (for those 
conducting searches) and its allure (for just about everyone else). 
The first distinction between a container and a computer is 
that a computer does not “hold” data in the traditional sense.  
Rather, it is composed of data.153  The structure of a file cabinet is 
a shell with drawers, and it can contain file folders.  But the 
essence of a computer is its files – a great many files.154  One 
gigabyte155 of storage can hold 100,000 pages of single-spaced 
text.156  A new computer in early 2010 has the capacity to store 
upwards of eight terabytes – the equivalent of roughly 800 million 
pages of single-spaced text.157  Simply put, there is no traditional 
“container” that can match a computer in terms of the sheer 
volume of information it can hold. 
Another obvious difference is in how the dimensions of a 
traditional container inherently limit a search.  An officer may look 
for items enumerated in the warrant only in places where they 
might be found and cannot look in a place smaller than the item to 
be seized.158  However, the natural limitation a container imposes 
upon a search does not apply to a computer.  The computer 
provides no clue as to what the bytes of information stored inside 
it comprise.  Even if it is known that a piece of evidence can be 
found within the computer, an officer conducting a search of that 
computer is provided relatively little in the way of signposts to 
indicate which bytes of data to examine.  For example, a folder 
labeled “music” may not necessarily contain music files.  The 
search can quickly become the equivalent of looking for a needle 
in a digital haystack.159 
 
 153 Wayne Jekot, Computer Forensics, Search Strategies, and the Particularity 
Requirement, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2 (2007). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Gigabytes and terabytes are units of measurement for data storage capacity or 
computer memory.  The smallest measurable unit is a bit.  There are 8 bits in a byte.  A 
gigabyte is the approximate equivalent of one million bytes.  A terabyte is the approximate 
equivalent of one trillion bytes.  See Byte Converter, What’s A Byte?,  
http://www.whatsabyte.com/P1/byteconverter.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2010). 
 156 Jason McKay, Why Should I Use Electronic Signatures?, Articles 3000, 
http://www.articles3000.com/Gadgets-and-Gizmos/13901/Why-Should-I-Use-Electronic-
Signatures.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2009). 
 157 Id.; Apple Store, Mac Pro Technical Specifications, 
http://www.apple.com/macpro/specs.html (last visited April 11, 2010). 
 158 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982). 
 159 Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 279, 301 (2005). 
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2. Other Atypical Containers 
Before computers, courts had to apply search and seizure 
requirements to other atypical containers.160  Items such as 
audiotapes and pagers have been construed as types of 
containers that can hold potential evidence.161  As with a 
computer, one cannot tell just by looking at a videotape what is 
stored on the videotape.162  The only way to find out what it 
contains is to play it back.163  Consequently, the Ninth Circuit has 
upheld a search (i.e., a “viewing”) of a cassette tape,164 and an 
Illinois appellate court allowed the seizure and subsequent search 
of an eight-millimeter tape.165 
Despite the similarities, there are differences between a tape 
and a computer.  At a minimum, these types of items dictate the 
form of the contents.  An audiocassette tape will contain an audio 
record.  With a videotape, one is assured of finding visual images.  
Both of these media have inherent limitations that help narrow a 
search.  One would not play back an audiotape to search for a 
video recording.  A computer, however, has no such limitations.  If 
the item can be reduced to a digital form, the computer may 
contain it.166 
3. Different Search Protocols for Computers 
Despite the impulse to compare a computer to a container, 
the Ninth Circuit has shifted away from applying traditional 
container search protocols to computers, due to the difficulties 
noted above.  As previously stated, while a specific search 
warrant is not necessary to search a traditional container, Payton 
appears to hold that a search warrant is necessary to search a 
computer.167 
The Payton court noted the differences between the search of 
a computer and a search of a container.  “[S]earches of computers 
 
 160 United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 161 Id. (microcassette audio tape); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 
1990) (pager). 
 162 People v. Donath, 827 N.E.2d 1001, 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d at 654-55. 
 165 Donath, 827 N.E.2d  at 1013. 
 166 Currently, most things can be reduced to a digital form; examples include music, 
videos, and photographs, as well as every type of document, including books, newspapers, 
and bills. 
 167 United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 863-64 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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. . . involve a degree of intrusiveness much greater in quantity, if 
not different in kind, from searches of other containers. Such 
considerations commonly support the need specifically to 
authorize the search of computers in a search warrant.”168  The 
court further noted that “affidavits seeking warrants for the search 
of computers often include a limiting search protocol, and judges 
issuing warrants may place conditions on the manner and extent 
of such searches, to protect privacy and other important 
constitutional interests.”169  In contrast, no search warrant is 
required to look inside a “traditional” container if it could harbor the 
evidence sought.170  Thus, a computer might best be described as 
a “place” to be searched, rather than a type of container, making a 
computer more analogous to a house. 
Despite acknowledging these differences, the court 
recognized that computers must still be susceptible to searches. It 
stated in Giberson: 
While it is true that computers can store a large amount of 
material, there is no reason why officers should be permitted to 
search a room full of filing cabinets or even a person’s library for 
documents listed in a warrant but should not be able to search a 
computer.171 
This statement, however, was made with one caveat:  in order to 
search a computer, a warrant must be sought.172 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S IMPLIED BRIGHT-LINE RULE 
In Payton, the court analyzed the question of whether a 
search warrant that authorized (1) a search of Payton’s premises 
and (2) seizure of records such as “[s]ales ledgers showing 
narcotics transactions such as pay/owe sheets,” authorized the 
officers to look for such records in Payton’s computer.173  The 
Payton court applied its “recent and controlling precedent” of 
Giberson and answered the question in the negative.  Under the 
facts present in Payton, the warrant did not authorize a search of 
 
 168 Id. at 862. 
 169 Id. at 864. 
 170 United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 171 United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 172 Id. at 890-91. 
 173 Payton, 573 F.3d at 862. 
23
Rados: Computer Searches and Seizures
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010
320 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
Payton’s computer.174  Whether or not it intended to do so, the 
Payton court – with its imprecise discussion of Giberson – 
appears to have created a bright-line rule:  to search a computer, 
even for items listed on a warrant that could be contained in the 
computer, the officers must have a warrant authorizing the 
computer’s search.175 
In Giberson, the court indicated that it was not endorsing the 
proposition that a “computer is an exception to the general 
principle that a warrant authorizing the seizure of particular 
documents also authorizes the search of a container likely to 
contain those documents.”176  The defendant in Giberson had 
urged the court to hold that, if a computer was not listed on the 
warrant, it could not be seized or searched.177  But the Giberson 
court instead held that, because there had been ample evidence 
near the computer to indicate that “seizable items” were stored on 
the computer, it was reasonable for the officers “to secure the 
computer and obtain a specific warrant and search it.”178 
The Payton court summarized Giberson as having examined 
the question of whether “computers [are] exception[s] to the 
general principle that a warrant authorizing the seizure of 
particular documents also authorizes the search of a container 
likely to contain those documents.”179  The Payton court quoted 
Giberson’s holding:  “We hold that, in this case, where there was 
ample evidence that the documents in the warrant could be found 
on Giberson’s computer, the officers did not exceed the scope of 
the warrant when they seized the computer.”180  The Payton court 
then interpreted the passage as holding that, under certain 
circumstances, computers are not an exception to the rule 
permitting searches of containers and, by “negative inference,” 
where such “certain circumstances” are absent, “a search of a 
computer not expressly authorized by a warrant is not a 
reasonable search.”181  Thus, the Payton court suggested that it 
was merely applying a rule already established in Giberson:  
officers can conduct a search of a computer for seizable items that 
could be stored in the computer only if they possess a warrant 
 
 174 Id. at 862-63. 
 175 Id. at 863-64. 
 176 Giberson, 572 F.3d at 887-88. 
 177 Id. at 886. 
 178 Id. at 889. 
 179 Payton, 573 F.3d at 862-63. 
 180 Id. at 863 (quoting Giberson, 572 F.3d at 887) (emphasis in original). 
 181 Id. 
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authorizing a search of the computer, except in circumstances 
where – as in Giberson – there is evidence indicating that the 
seizable items are in the computer.182 
The Payton court’s application of Giberson was flawed in two 
critical respects.  First, the court blurs the distinction between 
seizing a computer and searching it.  Second, in its analysis, the 
court glosses over the critical fact that the officers in Giberson 
obtained a subsequent warrant before conducting their search of 
the computer.  The Giberson court had approved the officers’ two-
step process of “securing” the computer and then obtaining a 
subsequent warrant that specifically authorized its search.183  The 
holding of Payton, and a proper reading of the Giberson case, 
leads to one conclusion:  In order to search a computer for 
seizable items that may be found on the computer, a warrant, 
either the initial one or a subsequent one, is required.184 
This conclusion is further supported by the court’s repeated 
expression of concerns about computer searches conducted 
without a warrant and the need for judicial oversight.185  The court 
noted that 
the nature of computers makes such searches so intrusive that 
affidavits seeking warrants for the search of computers often 
include a limiting search protocol, and judges issuing warrants 
may place conditions on the manner and extent of such 
searches, to protect privacy and other important constitutional 
interests.186 
The court further stated that it was “important to preserve the 
option of imposing such conditions when they are deemed 
warranted by judicial officers authorizing the search of 
computers.”187  Finally, the court pointed to the officers’ actions in 
Giberson and noted that the “searching officers . . . stop[ped] and 
[sought] an explicit warrant when they encounter[ed] a computer 
that they [had] reason to believe should be searched.”188 
While the Ninth Circuit rejected defendant Giberson’s bright-
line proposition that a computer can never be searched if it is not 
 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Giberson, 572 F.3d at 889; Payton, 573 F.3d at 863. 
 185 Payton, 573 F.3d at 864. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
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listed on the original warrant,189 in Payton, it suggested that a 
computer cannot be searched without a warrant.190  So, while 
other containers found during a warrant-based search may be 
searched under authority of the warrant, the same does not hold 
true for a computer.  Thus in Payton, the Ninth Circuit appeared to 
do precisely what it said it would not do in Giberson:  create a 
bright-line rule that a warrant is necessary for a search of a 
computer. 
IV. TOWARD A PRACTICAL STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS IN 
 COMPUTER SEARCHES 
In practice, the apparent bright-line rule in Payton will likely 
not serve its purpose of protecting searches of computers.  
Officers will include computers on all future search warrants if any 
of the items they seek could reasonably be found on a computer.  
By doing so, they will preserve the option of a search without the 
need to present ample evidence in support of such a search but in 
the process will obliterate any pretense of computer privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment.  A more practical standard of 
reasonableness in computer searches and warrants is needed.  
This Part analyzes why a seizure is often necessary before a 
search and concludes with a proposed guideline for future 
computer searches. 
A. WHY A SEIZURE IS ADVISABLE BEFORE A SEARCH 
The Ninth Circuit drew a distinction between the officer’s 
actions in Payton and the officer’s actions in Giberson.191  In 
Payton, the officer searched first and seized second; whereas in 
Giberson, the officer seized first, then sought a warrant and 
searched second.192  The Supreme Court has recognized the less-
intrusive nature of a seizure of property, noting that, while “[a] 
seizure affects a person’s possessory interest; a search affects a 
person’s privacy interest.”193  The Ninth Circuit echoed this 
observation and acknowledged that, while “[a] seizure of a 
computer to await a second warrant is nevertheless a Fourth 
 
 189 Giberson, 572 F.3d at 887. 
 190 Payton, 573 F.3d at 864. 
 191 Id. at 863. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984). 
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Amendment seizure, . . . it is far less intrusive than a search.”194  
This distinction recognizes the vast amount of information a 
computer can hold and the possible constitutional rights that may 
be trampled if the search is conducted without judicial 
supervision.195  The Supreme Court has noted that, while property 
may be temporarily seized without a warrant, no further action will 
be allowed without a warrant.196  A neutral, detached magistrate 
will first have to determine if there is sufficient probable cause to 
carry out the search of the seized property.197 
Of course, the mandate to seize first and search second is 
contrary to the usual protocol of a search and seizure.  Officers 
are allowed to seize only those items specifically authorized by the 
warrant.198  The warrant must name both the specific place to be 
searched and the particular items to be seized.199  Computers, 
however, pose a significant problem in this area because the 
documents to be seized, which may be in the form of electronic 
files, are often intermingled with scores of other files.200  Without a 
search-limiting protocol in place, a search of a computer’s files 
can quickly devolve into an impermissible and unconstitutional 
general search.201 
Arguably, the absence of a search-limiting protocol is what 
the court was most concerned with in Payton.202  The officer found 
the computer in Payton’s bedroom, moved the mouse, deactivated 
the screen saver, and then clicked on the first file he saw.203  
While it is true that some of the items in the warrant could be 
found in the computer, there were no set limitations guiding his 
search.  Searching a computer without established parameters is 
tantamount to going into a house and opening drawers 
indiscriminately.  The Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent 
precisely that kind of arbitrary government search. 
A computer search can require a level of technical expertise 
beyond that of the executing officers and can take hours to 
 
 194 Payton, 573 F.3d at 863. 
 195 Id. at 864. 
 196 Segura, 468 U.S. at 806. 
 197 Id. at 807. 
 198 Maryland. v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). 
 199 Id. 
 200 United States v. Giberson, 572 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United 
States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
 201 United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 860. 
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complete.204  This is due to the possibility that the data sought 
“may be mislabeled, encrypted, stored in hidden directories, or 
embedded in ‘slack space’ that a simple file listing will ignore.”205  
As a result, requiring officers to search through computer files on 
the premises in order to seize only those files listed on the warrant 
has been recognized as unreasonable.206  A lengthy on-site 
computer search can also be overly intrusive to the premises 
occupants.207  These considerations in turn have made it 
necessary for officers to make a wholesale seizure of the 
computer in order to search it at a different time and location and 
under the guidance of a new warrant.208  This exemplifies how the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement has demanded 
flexibility to adapt to the challenges of new technologies.  Many 
courts have responded by adopting a new Fourth Amendment 
rule:  “A valid warrant entitles investigators to seize computers and 
search them off-site at a later date.”209 
B. A PROPOSED GUIDELINE FOR SEIZING AND SECURING A 
 COMPUTER 
The main concern expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Payton is 
the need to protect privacy interests that are easily violated in 
computer searches not subject to judicial supervision.210  If a 
computer is discovered in the course of a search, and it is 
reasonable to believe that the evidence sought could be found on 
the computer, the computer should be seized, and a second 
warrant to govern the search of the computer should be 
 
 204 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND 
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE MANUAL 77 (Sept. 2009), available at 
www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/02ssma.pdf. 
 205 Id. at 76.  “Slack space” is the unused space at the end of a file in a disk cluster.  
PC Magazine Encyclopedia, Definition of: Slack Space, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=slack+space&i=56995,00.asp (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2010).  A hidden directory is invisible when looking at the directory listing in 
which it exists.  The Linux Information Project, Hidden File Definition, 
http://www.linfo.org/hidden_file.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2010).  Encryption is typically 
used for file security.  It is the process in which words are changed into an unreadable 
code.  Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/encryption (last visited Apr. 24, 2010). 
 206 United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383-84 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 207 United States v. Schandl, 947 F.2d 462, 465-66 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 208 Id. 
 209 Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 279, 315 (2005). 
 210 United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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obtained.211 
There are practical considerations in implementing such a 
procedure.  As was the case in Payton, computers are frequently 
left “on” and in screen-saver mode or in standby or sleep mode.212  
In order to seize a computer and protect the computer’s data (and 
physical components in the computer itself), the computer must be 
properly powered down.  Failing to do so could jeopardize 
unsaved work in open applications and possibly the entire hard 
drive.213  In order to preserve the integrity of the computer, Fourth 
Amendment protections, and the administration of justice, officers 
should follow this proposed set of guidelines in order to establish a 
clear and consistent protocol for computer seizures: 
Proposed Computer Seizure Protocol 
 
1.  Note the circumstances that lead the officer to believe the 
computer may contain the evidence sought on the warrant.  
Examples of such circumstances include whether the evidence 
sought is easily reduced to digital form214 and whether there is 
anything prohibiting the computer from working in its normal 
capacity.215 
 
2.  Note whether the computer is powered off, in screen-saver 
mode, or in standby or sleep mode.  By recording the status of 
the computer, the officer can justify moving the mouse as would 
be necessary to properly power down the computer.216 
 
 211 Recommended computer search protocols and guidelines are beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
 212 When a computer is in standby or sleep mode, it is still “on,” but the screen 
appears dark because the computer is using less electricity.  A screen saver is activated on 
most computers when a computer is not in use after a specified period of time (as set by 
the user).  The purpose of a screen saver is to prevent phosphor burn-in on the computer 
screen – something that was of concern with older cathode-ray-tube screens but less so 
now with LCD screens. 
 213 A computer typically comes with a resource guidebook warning against improperly 
shutting down the computer.  For example, the Toshiba Resource Guide, for the Satellite 
A80/A85 Series Laptop Computer, notes that “[t]urning off the computer while it is reading 
from or writing to a disk may damage the disk, the drive, or both.”  It also states that “[i]f the 
network you are using goes down and you must restart your computer to reconnect, or if 
your battery runs out of charge while you are working, you will lose all work since you last 
saved.” 
 214 Examples are documents that can be created with computer software, scanned, or 
downloaded off the Internet, or any photos, video or voice recordings. 
 215 This was one of the considerations applied by the Colorado Supreme Court in 
People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 154 (Colo. 2004). 
 216 “Power down” is equivalent to “turn off.” 
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a.  If the computer is in standby or sleep mode, move the 
mouse or press the return key to reactivate the screen.  
Record what is on the screen.  This would ensure a 
complete and accurate record of what was done and what 
was seen in the course of seizing the computer. 
 
b.  If the computer is in screen-saver mode, note what is on 
the screen saver.  Move the mouse and de-activate the 
screen saver.  Note again what is on the screen. 
3. Save any open documents.  This needs to be done to protect  
against the possible loss of any data. 
4. Close all open applications.  This will ensure against possible 
corruption to the computer hard drive and its applications. 
 
5.  Power down the computer properly. 
By recording the steps taken in seizing the computer and 
making a note of all that was done and seen, a complete record of 
what happened to the computer will be available for both the 
police and the magistrate.217  The officer should then prepare a 
new affidavit seeking a search warrant from the magistrate.  The 
affidavit should state the reasons why a search of the computer is 
necessary, outline the steps that were taken to preserve the 
computer and its contents during the seizure, and describe the 
search protocol that will be used to protect privacy interests.  This 
equivalent of chain-of-custody documentation would serve the 
government’s interest in preserving evidence while protecting the 
individual’s right of privacy in his or her computer. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Payton, the Ninth Circuit properly reversed the district 
court’s denial of a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by 
way of a computer search not listed in a warrant.  However, the 
court based its reasoning on an impractical standard of 
reasonableness that it first enunciated in Giberson.  In order to 
search a computer not listed on a warrant, the court stated there 
must be circumstances indicating a likelihood that the items to be 
 
 217 Images revealed on the computer screen, as the steps are taken to power off the 
computer, may then become subject to the plain-view doctrine.  A discussion of the plain-
view doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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seized are contained in the computer.218  This standard means 
that it is not enough that the items sought could reasonably be 
found on the computer.  This creates a significantly stricter 
standard than that employed for traditional containers. 
In Payton and Giberson, the Ninth Circuit appears to have 
done precisely what it said it would not do:  create a bright-line 
rule for computers.  The court distinguished computers from 
traditional containers and applied to computers a heightened 
standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.219  The court 
further implied that, in order to search a computer, it is necessary 
to procure a search warrant.220  By obtaining a warrant, the court 
reasoned that constitutional privacy interests could be 
protected.221  Since the circumstances in Payton failed to meet the 
heightened reasonableness standard and the officer did not obtain 
a search warrant before searching the computer, the court arrived 
at the correct result:  suppression of the evidence.  But the court’s 
new standard has the unfortunate effect of creating hurdles for 
police officers seeking to conduct a computer search.  To get 
around the heightened reasonableness standard that requires 
demonstrating circumstances that show evidence would be found 
on a particular computer, officers will request authorization to 
search a computer in every case where evidence could be 
reduced to a digital form.  This will undermine the very privacy 
interests that the Payton court sought to protect. 
In computer search cases, when officers need to seize a 
computer for a subsequent search, they should follow the 
Proposed Computer Seizure Protocol in order to ensure that 
privacy interests are protected and that the integrity of the 
computer remains intact.  This will have the benefit of enhancing 
the government’s ability to properly prosecute crimes while at the 
same time preserving citizens’ privacy rights under the Fourth 
Amendment.  That is a result that surely would satisfy the Payton 
court. 
 
 218 United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States 
v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 219 Id. at 864. 
 220 Id. at 863. 
 221 Id. at 864. 
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